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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----------------------~-----------~------
ROBERT MYERS and JACKIE MYERS, ) 
his wife, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
REGGIE McDONALD, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
Case No. 17046 
RESPONDENT REGGIE McDONALD'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Appellants, Robert Myers and Jackie Myers, filed 
suit in the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County against defendant Reggie McDonald for the alleged 
wrongful death of one Bobbie Charles Menzies which resulted 
from an automobile accident on November 22, 1976. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss based upon the 
limitation period found in Utah Code Annotated §78-12-28 
was heard on March 13, 1980, and an Order granting said 
Motion was entered on March 31, 1980. Plaintiffs appealed 
from that Order. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-appellants seek a reversal of the 
judgment of the lower court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-respondent lacks any information and 
belief to confirm those facts cited by plaintiffs-
appellants relative to earlier proceedings on the custody 
and guardianship of their ward, Bobbie Charles Menzies·. 
The fact that the instant action was filed on October 29, 
1979, more than two years after the alleged death of 
Menzies, is undisputed and confirmed by the record on 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED AT 
THE TIME OF THE DEATH OF THEIR WARD. 
Plaintiffs have appropriately cited this court's 
earlier decision in Platz v. International Smelting Co., 
61 Ut. 342, 213 P. 187 (1922), as determinative of when a 
cause for wrongful death accrues. Plaintiffs have er-
roneously attempted to apply dictum in that case to sup-
..,-,.., ....... !.,..;1,;,>:~- ~·_J,o';f.,J:<:'""·l!'R!!·~~~'Jf.C.'.;_,:r:::..~,:_.:: ·~·'-" 
p~rt their proposition that a cause of action for wrongful 
death does not accrue until the potential plaintiff has 
knowledge of the death. They cite as authority for that 
proposition the following language quoted from an earlier 
federal court decision: 
To start the running of a statute of 
limitations, there must be someone capable 
of suing, someone subject to be sued, and 
a tribunal open for such suits. 213 P. at 
188. 
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The language quoted above concededly is in line 
with the contemplation of the Statute of Limitations but 
plaintiffs' argument is self-defeating. From the time of 
.,_,~·'-·..;~·-·-',"..-h,·-J(~ 
death of plaintiffs' ward, if in fact the person called 
------A'' ,,, 
"Joey" was Bobbie Charles Menzies, the plaintiffs were-
~ 8-'°!.-.·-,-~£cJ>;,.;,.,, . . C_·,--.-._.oo,,;'~ 
authorized by statute to bring their action for wrongful 
.. 
~ 
death. In addition, the defendant-respondent was subject 
to suit in the jurisdiction of any court within the state 
of Utah. Thus, the requirements expressed above were met 
at the death of Menzies. 
As a matter of fact, contrary to plaintiffs' 
characterization, the Platz decision closely parallels the 
instant matter. In Platz, this court was asked to construe 
the predecessor of our present wrongful death statute, the 
earlier version being nearly identical to the present. 
The specific question addressed was whether the cause of 
action failed to accrue until the administrator of the 
deceased was appointed almost two years after the death of 
the deceased. This court answered that question thusly: 
The great weight of authority, if not the 
unanimous authority, supports the argument 
of respondent to the effect that the sta-
tute of limitations began to run against 
the right of action immediately after the 
death of the intestate. The Supreme Court 
of Kentucky, in Louisville and N.R. Company 
v. Sanders, 86 Ken. 259, 5 S.W. 563, in our 
judgment, lays down the rule that is sup-
ported both by reason and authority as 
follows: 
- 3 -
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'Upon the other hand, however, the law evi-
dently looks to a speedy settlement of such 
claims. This is its policy. It has 
therefore, prescribed the shortest pe;iod 
of limitation . . . . Public policy and the 
general quiet must be re9arded rather than 
the individual hardship. 
The statute of Missouri provides that an 
action for wrongful death may be brought by -
the husband or wife of the deceased, or, 
if their is no husband or wife, or he or 
she fails to sue within six months, then 
by the minor child of children of the de-
ceased. The statute of that state also 
provides that every such action must be 
commenced within one year after the cause 
of action shall have accrued. The Supreme 
Court of Missouri, in Kennedy v. Burrier, 
36 Mo. 128, said: 
'When, then did the cause of action accrue? 
We think the cause of action accrued when-
ever the defendant's liability became per-
fect and complete. Whenever the defendant 
had done an act which made him liable in 
damages, and there was person in esse to 
whom the damages ought to be paid and who 
might sue for and recover the same, then 
clearly the cause of action had accrued as 
against him. When, then, did this liabil-
ity take place? Evidently at the death of 
Kennedy. The defendant at that time had 
done the whole wrong complained of, and 
there was a person in esse - Kennedy's 
widow ~ entitled to receive and empowered 
to sue for the damages. Then the cause of 
action clearly accrued at the death of 
Kennedy, and the statute commenced running 
from that time. The fact that the right 
to damages, and consequent right to sue 
for them, at different times, is vested in 
different individuals, can make no differ-
ence as to the time the cause of action 
accrued.' 61 Ut. at 348. 
It is clear that this court, speaking to the 
~-:r-.: ~~.,,~11:~_,:,,..rl-'<'""·~~,-:-~..---'.,,,,,-~--·"r-··;'~·;r;:,,,, 
same question as in the instant case, held that the right 
. ~..-:.11·::-·:::· _......, 
of action for wrongful death accrued at the time of death 
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and that the Statute of Limitations begins to run from 
that time. The court apparently resisted arguments con-
trary to this posture on the grounds that the demands of 
public policy for a general quiet are greater than claims 
of individual hardship. 
Because the plaintiffs were legally capa~le of 
~~,,_-1_~-t.0.,.A•~:.:.,~ ... ·~- -._.,,_, - ...... - • ~ 
bringing suit against the defendant-respondent at the time 
of .. the death of their ward, the limitat~on per~od __ beg_~n to 
,~-........... --!!!!-- .,. ... " ·-"~~·· 
run at that time. Thus, plaintiffs' cause of was limited 
~,--···· 
by §78-12-1 which states: 
Civil actions can be commenced only within 
the periods prescribed in this chapter 
after the cause of action shall have 
accrued, except where in special cases a 
different limitation is prescribed by 
statute. 
Section 78-12-28 establishes a two year limita-
tion period for wrongful death actions. Nowhere does it 
appear in the statutes or case law of this jurisdiction 
authority for the proposition that a different limitation 
period is applicable. 
Plaintiffs concede that the two year period has 
long since expired and accordingly, the claim is now barred 
as found by the court below. 
POINT II. 
WHETHER THE LIMITATION PERIOD ON WRONGFUL 
DEATH ACTIONS IS "GENERAL" OR "SPECIAL" IS 
IMMATERIAL TO THE INSTANT CASE. 
- 5 -
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Assuming, without deciding, that the limitation 
... 
statute for wrongful death actions is a "general" statute 
as opposed to a "special" statute, it still does not 
change the result of the question presented to this court. 
Whether the statute is "general" or "special" is immaterial 
because there is no authority, statutory or otherwise, 
which dictates that the lack of knowledge of one's claim 
in a wrongful death contest, constitutes an effective 
~"-'"'-"""-'".,..,-0::.·.1· ... ~r.)!;,,.:1.'''<1 1, ..... ,;,,,:;,_,,.. ··~~-.:. ~11JJ;, .'~~'t.;. - -
tolling of the Statute of Limitations. 
The cases cited by plaintiffs for the proposi-
tion that the Statute of Limitations was tolled by plain-
tiffs' lack of knowledge of the death of their ward are 
clearly distinguishable and not controlling. 
In the recent case cited by appellant of Foil v. 
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Ut. 1979), the court was address-
ing a question entirely center~~_Jn the Medical Malpractic;e 
~- _ .. _ - ,_ -·~;....;:<='-..i~-----~· .. --
Statute and its associated Statute of Limitation. In that 
case this court specifically held: 
In determining the proper construction to 
be placed upon §78-14-4, it is important 
to keep in focus the proposition that the 
section deals only with malpractice actions 
against health-care providers; it is not a 
general statute of limitations • • . . 
Because of the nature of the malpractice 
actions and based upon prior Utah law, we 
hold that the statute begins to run when an 
injured person k£!-2~~ or_ should know that he 
has suffered a legal injury. 
-
- 6 -
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This court clearly has stated that §78-14-4, and 
its attendant "knowledge" requirement deals "only with 
malpractice actions and is not a general Statute of Limita-
tions, and the reason for its special tolling provision is 
the unique nature of malpractice actions. 
This court in Foil went to great lengths to ex-
plain that provisions of the Malpractice Act, including 
tolling provisions, do not apply to other types of actions, 
i.e., wrongful death, etc. Foil accordingly is not to be 
read with other decisions of this court as controlling of 
any issue outside the realm of malpractice actions. 
Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244 (Ut. 1980), is 
also not controlling and is distinguishable from the in-
stant case. In Switzer, the court ruled that the Statute 
of Limitation for wrongful death actions is tolled by a 
Disability Statute. In the present controversy the plain-
tiffs do no claim any tolling by the Disability Statute or 
any other statute specifically designed for the same 
effect. 
Respondent argues that the Switzer decision was 
a narrow decision construing specifically the effect of 
§78-12-36(1) on §78-12-28(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). This court in its closing paragraph accordingly 
stated: 
- 7 -
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From the foregoing cited cases in which 
statutory provisions similar to those in-
volved herein were construed, the conclu-
sion is compelling that the limitations 
~eriod of §78-12-28(2) is tolled by 
~78-12-36(1), in an action for wrongful 
death pursuant to §78-11-7. 
Clearly, Switzer speaks to specfic statutes and 
cannot be read as broad as the appellants suggest. 
POINT III. 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS A LEGAL 
RATHER THAN AN EQUITABLE DEFENSE AND 
HENCE MAY BE INTERPOSED REGARDLESS OF 
EQUITIES. 
Appellants represent to the court alleged facts 
not properly supported or before the court in this proceed-
ing. Again assuming, without deciding said facts are 
accurate and admissible, their existence does not destroy 
respondent's defense based on the Statute of Limitations. 
In the case of Patsy v. Budge, 38 P.2d 712 
(1934), this court stated: 
It is argued by plaintiff that the defen-
dant 'is equitably estopped from pleading 
the Statute of Limitations as a bar to 
plaintiff's action,' and points to plain-
tiff's allegations: that the defendant 
with intent to deceive the plaintiff and 
to induce her from bringing an action 
against him for his said negligence and 
malpractice of which he well knew he was 
guilty, fraudulently concealed from plain-
tiff the facts as to his negligence, or 
the fact that the said broken steel blade 
was in her body and was the·cause of her 
distress and suffering, etc. 
- 8 -
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It must be remembered that the Statute of 
Limitations is a legal, and not an equit-
able, defense. It is available, regardless 
of the equities, if the facts are such as 
to warrant the interposition of the plea. 
38 P.2d at 716. 
The case of Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 620 
(1974), cited by plaintiffs is not helpful to their 
position and accordingly, appellant's claim of equitable 
estoppel must fail in this instance. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that plaintiffs have no authority 
for their proposition that the cause of action accrued at 
the time they learned of the death of their ward. Cases 
cited by plaintiffs are distinguishable and do not control 
the outcome of this controversy. The court below was 
correct in its interpretation of the existing law in Utah 
and this court should affirm the decision rendered. 
1980. 
Respectfully submitted this ~?- day of August, 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
- 9 -
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
HAND-DELIVERED, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Respondent's Brief this d~ day of August, 
1980 to Mr. Anthony M. Thurber, Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 211 East Broadway, Suite 213, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
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